WITTGENSTEIN’S “REMARKS ON COLOUR”: FROM COLOUR LOGIC TO SOCIAL STUDIES OF COLOUR

Surovtsev V. A., Rodin K. A.

DOI: 10.23951/2312-7899-2020-2-25-38

Information About Author:

Valery A. Surovtsev, Institute of Philosophy and Law of the Siberian Branch of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Novosibirsk, Russian Federation. E-mail: surovtsev1964@mail.ru Kirill A. Rodin, Institute of Philosophy and Law of the Siberian Branch of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Novosibirsk, Russian Federation. E-mail: rodin.kir@gmail.com

The main theme in Wittgenstein’s “Remarks on Colour” is the logic (or grammar) of colour. We consider the logic of colour in the context of various reductionist projects in which logical relations between colour concepts are planned to be reduced to an objective definition of colour (it is the first variant of reduction and here we will take as an example a project of Jonathan Westphal) or are planned to be universalized within the framework of a certain explication (such may be the colour octahedron, etc.) (the second variant). When examined in detail, both variants show their own insolvency. We read Wittgenstein’s remarks on colour as a consistent criticism of any reductionist projects in the study of the relationship between colour concepts. In the first case (with Westphal) we adhere to the position of Elaine Horner. When considering universalistic reductions, we look in detail at the work of Gabriela Mras. In the final part of the article, we try to show how the universalist tendency (at the level of initial premises) influences some sociological and anthropological studies of colour (we briefly consider the works of William Rivers and Berlin & Kay). And our article can be taken as an additional commentary on the work of Martin Kusch.

Keywords: colour, colour concepts, logic of colours, language games, phenomenology, colour in sociology and anthropology

References:

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Bibikhin, V.V. (2005) Wittgenstein: Aspect Change. Moscow. (In Russian).

Horner, E. (2000) “There Cannot be a Transparent White”: A Defence of Wittgenstein's Account of the Puzzle Propositions. Philosophical Investigations. 23 (3). Pp. 218-241.

Kusch, M. (2014) Wittgenstein as a Commentator on the Psychology and Anthropology of Colour. In: Wittgenstein on Colour. Ed. by Stefan Riegelnik & Frederik A. Gierlinger. De Gruyter.. Pp. 93-108.

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Issue: 2, 2020

Series of issue: Issue 2

Rubric: ARTICLES

Pages: 25 — 38

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