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SHINE AND POVERTY OF SEMANTIC PLATONISM

Nekhaev A. V.

DOI: 10.23951/2312-7899-2022-3-118-126

Information About Author:

Andrei V. Nekhaev, Tomsk Scientific Center, Siberian Branch of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Russian Federation. University of Tyumen, Russian Federation. Omsk State Technical University, Russian Federation. E-mail: a.v.nekhaev@utmn.ru

The article presents criticism of Katz’s proto-theory. Based on the principles of semantic Platonism, he offers a new understanding of the relationship between sense and reference. However, his account faces three strong objections: against non-causal ways of accessing abstract Platonic entities (Benacerraf–Field–Cheyne), against intuition as the faculty to a priori knowledge of grammar facts (Horwich–Cheyne–Oliver), and against the medial status of finite intensionals in matters for fixing the reference of linguistic expressions (Kripke–Boghossian–Kush). Without convincing answers to these objections, Katz’s proto-theory cannot be considered as a fit competitor to naturalistic theories of language.

Keywords: Katz, sense, reference, abstract object, semantic Platonism

References:

Benacerraf, P. (1973). Mathematical Truth. The Journal of Philosophy, 70(19), 661–679.

Boghossian, P. (1993). Sense, Reference and Rule-Following. Philosophical Issues, 4, 135–141.

Cheyne, C. (1997). Getting in Touch with Numbers: Intuition and Mathematical Platonism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 57(1), 111–125.

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Cheyne, C. (2001). Knowledge, Cause, and Abstract Objects: Causal Objections to Platonism. Springer.

Field, H. (1989). Realism, Mathematics and Modality. Blackwell.

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Frege, G. (2000b). O smysle i znachenii [On sense and linguistic meaning]. In Z. A. Kuzicheva (Ed.), Logika i logicheskaya semantika. Sbornik trudov [Logic and logical semantics. Collected works] (pp. 230–246). Translated from German by B. V. Birykov. Aspekt Press.

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Picazo, G. (2021). The Long Shadow of Semantic Platonism, Part I: General Considerations. Philosophia, 49(4), 1427–1453.

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nekhaev_a._v._118_126_3_33_2022.pdf ( 267.41 kB ) nekhaev_a._v._118_126_3_33_2022.zip ( 262.46 kB )

Issue: 3, 2022

Series of issue: Issue 3

Rubric: ARTICLES. LANGUAGE MEANING AND LINGUISTIC REALISM IN CONTEXT OF ANALYTIC PHILOSOPHY

Pages: 118 — 126

Downloads: 70

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