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351 | This article is the final remark in the discussion on issues related to the construction of a semantic theory of ordinary language. Is a semantic theory of ordinary language possible? What form should this theory take? Is it possible to revive Gottlob Frege’s semantics in modern analytic philosophy? Can Jerrold Katz’s linguistic Platonism claim the status of a semantic theory of ordinary language? Is the concept “meaning as use” of the later Ludwig Wittgenstein a semantic theory? The participants of the discussion tried to answer these questions. The author of this article gives a brief summary of the positions presented in the discussion and draws general conclusions. Keywords: Frege, Wittgenstein, Katz, analytic philosophy, language, semantics, sense, meaning | 73 | |||||
352 | Semantic theories by Kaplan and Katz represent a view on ordinary language opposed to the view of the late Wittgenstein, Strawson, and others. Both Kaplan’s and Katz’s theories accommodate phenomena of contextuality, whereas Wittgenstein and Strawson held that contextuality makes a semantic theory for ordinary language impossible. I compare the two theories and show that both are based on analogous fourfold distinctions. In Kaplan, it is the distinction of expression, character, content, and reference. The analogous distinction in Katz is the distinction of expression, the sense of expression-type, the sense of expression-token, and reference. The analogy between Kaplan’s character and Katz’s sense of expression-type is established by the fact that both are, formally speaking, functions from contexts. Content (Kaplan) and the sense of expression-token (Katz) are similar in that both determine reference (extension) with respect to a possible world. So we can conclude that both theories represent the same approach to contextuality. Keywords: ordinary language, contextuality, semantics, Katz, Kaplan | 70 | |||||
353 | The article presents criticism of Katz’s proto-theory. Based on the principles of semantic Platonism, he offers a new understanding of the relationship between sense and reference. However, his account faces three strong objections: against non-causal ways of accessing abstract Platonic entities (Benacerraf–Field–Cheyne), against intuition as the faculty to a priori knowledge of grammar facts (Horwich–Cheyne–Oliver), and against the medial status of finite intensionals in matters for fixing the reference of linguistic expressions (Kripke–Boghossian–Kush). Without convincing answers to these objections, Katz’s proto-theory cannot be considered as a fit competitor to naturalistic theories of language. Keywords: Katz, sense, reference, abstract object, semantic Platonism | 69 |